FOREIGN POLICY OF AFRICAN STATES

EGYPT FOREIGN POLICY                                                                                                                                                                                                            Ever since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Egypt has been playing an important role in both the Middle East and international politics, featuring rather active foreign relations. To understand and perceive the foreign relations of contemporary Egypt at a macro level, focus should be placed on the following four points:

I. Geography: the Basis of Egypt’s Foreign Relations                                                                     Covering an area of about 1,020,000 square kilometers (2002:11), Egypt has a population of about 73,579,000 people (2006) (2007：pril 3). Possessing a land bridge between Asia and Africa, this transcontinental country is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Sudan to the south, the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia to the east, and Libya to the west. It is bordered by Israel and Palestine in west Asia. TheSuez Canal serves as an important waterway that connects the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean by way of the Red Sea. The geographical location of Egypt means a lot to Egypt. “The geographic position of Egypt predetermined the role of Egypt in history. A strong Egypt was capable of shouldering responsibilities in proportion to its geographical location while a declining Egypt would become nothing but part of a foreign empire controlling this position. When Egypt proved to be unable to make use of this position, others would always take it over. All in all, this physical position has never been discarded; neither would history have it discarded,” said Mohammed Hasaanein Heikal, a well-known Egyptian (Heikal, & Guan, 1992). The unique geographic position determines fundamental directions of Egypt’s foreign relations: The first refers to the Arab world. Geographically, Egypt is a bridge that connects the eastern and western parts of the Arab world, making Egypt the center of the Arab world. The unchangeable geographic and historical factors of Egypt, reiterated Nasser, predetermined that Egypt is not only part of the Arab world but also the center of the Arab world, the hero and leader who must undertake the mission of Arab unity (Chen, 2005:9). Therefore, what Nasser pursued throughout his political life was Arab nationalism. Prior to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, President Sadat fought for the lost land of the Arab world under the banner of Arab nationalism. However, ignoring the opposition of the Arab world, President Sadat made a separate peace with Israel, which isolated Egypt from the Arab family. “In history, Egypt has been playing two roles in the Arab world, i.e., unification and innovation. Now that Egypt, isolated from the Arab

family, has lost its ideals for the future and its activities also come to a standstill in its limited political and geographic spheres in this area. A situation similar to that in the Balkan area took shape here (Heikal, & Guan, 1992:371). After taking office, President Mubarak fully realized the important position of Egypt in the Arab world. He made great efforts so as to enhance the relations between Egypt and other Arab states, finally bringing Egypt back to the Arab family. Among the relations between Egypt and other Arab states, Egypt cares most about the following three states. The first country is Sudan. For one thing, Sudan has close ties with Egypt in history; the former has always been regarded by the latter as its strategic backyard. For another, Sudan, an upstream country on the Nile, bears on the water security of Egypt. The second country is Palestine. Palestine bears on

Egypt’s security in the east wing. In addition, as Palestine is a key entity at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is an important stage for Egypt to bring into play its influence in this area. The third country is Saudi Arabia. Due to the unique religious position and abundant oil dollars of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, on the one hand, longs for its support when it comes to Middle East affairs and more economic aid from Saudi Arabia, but, on the other hand, tries its best to avoid possible competition from Saudi Arabia in terms of regional influence. The second refers to Israel. As a powerful neighbor in the east, Israel is an important factor concerning the national security of Egypt. All previous Egyptian governments deemed that Israel is a major country to be alert against, always paying close attention to the situation in Israel. Even after peace was made between the two countries, Egypt still keeps an eye on Israel, unwilling to develop further relations with the latter. What’s more, the fact that Israel is the only Middle Eastern country in possession of nuclear weapons makes

Egypt upset. Former Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa (He is now the Arab League Secretary General) once said, “As long as Israel possesses any weapons of mass destruction that pose a threat to its neighbors, it’s unthinkable for Israel to integrate into this area” (Dowek, 2001:267). Of course, Israel has no complete trust in Egypt, either, which remains an important factor for the appearance and continuation of Egypt’s “cold peace” with Israel. The third refers to great powers in the international community. It has been a difficult problem for Egypt to tackle with its relations with

great powers (especially the US and the Soviet Union) in the international community. “In terms of its relations with other countries,” argued critics, “Egypt’s relationship with the Arab world affects its foreign relations within the region as a whole while its relations with the UK, the US and the Soviet Union are of great significance outside this region. The interference of these three powers is one root reason for the long-term disturbance in the Middle East. Egypt’s relations with these three powers stand out among all its foreign relations. To be more specific, Egypt’s relationship with the US and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, seem particularly important for it affects the overall situation of Egypt’s foreign relations” (Chen, 2005:34). As a result, Egypt has to be rather cautious

so as to survive the fighting between world powers. For instance, during Nasser’s reign, although Egypt was in close ties with the Soviet Union, it also kept a relationship with the US for a long time. Later on, during Mubarak’s reign, although Egypt was on good terms with the US, it also developed a relationship with the Soviet Union (Russia) so as to seek some kind of balance. The fourth refers to Europe and Africa. Geographically, Egypt is close to Europe. Actually, both sides had close ties in history. In modern times, Egypt was deeply influenced by Europe and later, under the invasion and control of European powers, finally became a semi-colony and protectorate of the UK. After the Suez War of 1956, the influence of the UK and France on Egypt was actually not worth mentioning. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt’s relation with Europe, especially with the European Community, underwent substantial changes. Egypt and the European Community began bilateral cooperation and political talks. The first decade of the 21^st century saw rapid development of bilateral relations between Egypt and Europe. In May 2004 Egypt and Europe signed a partnership agreement, followed by frequent visits of state leaders. By the end of 2006, President Mubarak had paid 46 visits to France, 24 visits to Germany and 18 visits to Italy (Wang, 2006:86). At the same time, state leaders of European Union countries also paid numerous visits to Egypt. In recent years, the European Union has become the largest trade partner of Egypt. For example, in 2005, Egypt’s imports from France and Germany reached €1.418 billion and €1.35 billion respectively. Its imports from Italy, the second biggest trade partner after the US, reached €2.6 billion (Wang, 2006:86). Besides, the European Union was one of Egypt’s main donors. Between 2004 and 2005, assistance from the EU to Egypt amounted to $ 522million (2005:133). Egypt has traditional relations with Africa. One ring in Nasser’s Three Ring Theory is Africa. When Nasser was still in office, Egypt supported the national liberation movements in Africa and Egypt had rather close ties with Africa. As most African countries opposed Sadat’s decision of making separate peace with Israel, the relationship between Egypt and Africa cooled down. During Mubarak’s reign, the bilateral relationship improved and moved forward steadily. Mubarak called for making all Africa a nuclear-free zone and he also made great mediation efforts to resolve armed conflicts in Africa. He was re-elected Chairman of the Organization of African Unity in 1993. In May 1998, Egypt joined the common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. Moreover, Egypt also signed bilateral economic and technological cooperation agreements with numerous African countries.

II. Interests: the Fundamental Starting Point of Egypt’s Foreign Relations

National interests are, said critics, “pivotal factors that determine and affect the behaviors of a state in international relations and inter-state relations reflect the interest interaction between different

political and economic entities.” (Zhang, 1989: 54). National interests are a comprehensive concept, mainly including security, economic and political interests (Zhang, 1989:55-56). The foreign relations of Egypt are no exception; their starting point and purpose is to safeguard the national interests of Egypt. However, different tasks encountered by Egypt at different times meant its national interests had different priorities, which correspondingly affected the foreign relations of Egypt. When Nasser

first took office, the primary task for Egypt was to realize and consolidate the national independence of Egypt and the most urgent problem was how Egypt could obtain enough weapons and economic

aid to defend the newly-born regime. As Egypt’s efforts of calling for help from Western countries failed, Egypt had to turn to the Soviet Union. The relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union

developed rapidly for the generous Soviet aid made Egypt almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union. After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the primary task of Egypt was to recover the Sinai

Peninsula occupied by Israel and save its collapsing economy. The US became what Egypt could rely on because of its unique influence on Israel and enormous amount of foreign aid. The following years saw rapid recovery and development between Egypt and the US. The Egyptian-Israeli relationship also briefly improved. The Soviet Union was ignored because it could not help Egypt as the US did. Then the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union went from bad to worse and finally the two countries fell apart. Former American Secretary of State Kissinger said, “Russians can only offer you (Egypt) weapons but we can offer you peace” (Heikal, & Xing, 1979:4). During Mubarak’s reign, the primary task faced with Egypt was to develop the economy and increase its regional influence. The first difficulty Mubarak faced was how to return to the Arab family. For this purpose, Egypt decided to freeze its relationship with Israel so as to win approbation from Arab countries step by step. Egypt gradually improved its relations with Arab countries and finally recovered diplomatic relationship with these countries. In May 1989, Egypt returned to the Arab League. Since the 1990s, Egypt has been improving its relations with Arab countries seriously and engaged itself in resolving big issues of the Arab world. Since then Egypt has been playing an important role in the Arab world. Meanwhile, considering the leading position of the US in the Middle East and its enormous aid to Egypt, Egypt continued to attach importance to its relationship with the US. The Egyptian-US relationship moved forward for further development. Although Egypt placed its relations with great powers in the center of its foreign strategy, Egypt tried to protect its national interest instead of simply catering for great powers. In its relation with the Soviet Union, Nasser insisted not approving the military base eagerly needed by the Soviet Union in spite that the Soviet Union offered Egypt a large amount of military and economic aid. When the “neither war nor peace” strategy of the Soviet Union hindered Egypt’s preparation for its war against Israel, President Sadat made up his mind to drive out the military experts of the Soviet Union of Egypt. During Mubarak’s reign, the US, as an ally of Egypt, continued to provide Egypt with a lot of military and economic aid, which, however, did not prevent Egypt from criticizing the US. Egypt made strong criticism of the US with regard to many issues. For instance, Egypt and the US had constant disputes over issues like the US-led global counterterrorism war and democratization and the peace process in the Middle East. Statistics of the US Congress show that 80% of Egypt’s votes on the general assembly of the UN were against the US (Wu, Chen, & Wang, 2004:128). Besides its national interests, Egypt, as an Arab country, also bears the mission of safeguarding the interests of the Arab nation. The Palestine-Israeli conflict is mainly concerned with the interests of the Arab nation. Egypt was a main force of the Arab camp in the Palestine-Israeli conflict. It has been working hard for the resolution of

the Palestine issue. During the peace talks between Palestine and Israel, Egypt always worked as a supporter of Palestine, pressuring Israel all along. When the Arab nation was faced with challenges,

Egypt was rather active in mediating all parties, fighting for unity of the whole Arab nation. To some extent, Egypt’s attitude was a symbol of the attitude of the Arab world. Nevertheless, the national interests of Egypt were often in discord with that of the Arab nation. On such occasions Egypt would sacrifice the interests of the Arab nation so as to protect its own interests. For example, to recover the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt sought for separate peace with Israel in breach of its policy of “no recognition, no peace, no negotiation” against Israel. This badly damaged the interests of the Arab nation, which was also the root cause that Egypt was isolated by Arab countries after Egypt

had made peace with Israel. In addition, the heavy debts and responsibilities that Egypt bears caused much negative influence on itself. For instance, Egypt’s involvement with the Palestine-Israeli conflict caused severe human resource, economic and military losses to itself. Egypt’s economic losses in the four Arab-Israeli wars reached $100 billion (Wang, 2006:32). Nasser’s keen support to Arab revolutions, especially its involvement in the Yemeni Civil War, brought more losses than gains. During Mubarak’s administration, however, Egypt paid great attention to the balance between its national interests and the interests of the Arab nation. For example, before most Arab countries recognized Israel, Egypt insisted that Egypt should maintain peace with Israel but the Egyptian-Israeli relationship must be kept at a reasonably low level. Of course, all the Arab countries, including Egypt, are faced with the balance between their national interests and the interests of the Arab world. The discord between the two kinds of interests also affects the relations between Arab countries. The relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia was a typical example, in which case both fought for the legal rights of the Arab nations. When Egypt was fighting against Israel in the front, Saudi Arabia offered Egypt tremendous financial support. In particular, the unity and cooperation between the two countries during the Yom Kippur War was exemplary. To push forward the peace process of the Middle East, Egypt made great mediating efforts between the Arab world and Israel while Saudi Arabia put forward a peace plan in 1981 and then another in 2002. During the Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War, both were dedicated to the liberation of Kuwait. However, from time to time there were also disputes between Egypt and Saudi Arabia because of their disparities in national interests and ideology. The worst case occurred during the Yemeni Civil War in the 1960s. The two countries once broke off their diplomatic relations because of their different

opinions on making peace with Israel. Moreover, the two countries were in discord because they both wanted to be the leader of the Arab and the Islamic world. For instance, when making security

arrangement in the Gulf area after the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia rejected the proposal of rebuilding its security forces out of Egyptian troops, instead, Saudi Arabia relied on Western countries for its safety. The imbalance between the interests of Arab countries and the interests of the Arab nation influenced the unity and cooperation in the Arab world badly. “All Arab nationalists require, consciously or subconsciously, the interests of Arab nationalism to be subordinated to their national interests, class interests and personal interests, which is the very reason why Arab nationalism cannot lead the Arab nation to unification,” said some critics (Yang & Zhu, 1996:82).

III. The Cold War: the International Background of Egypt’s Foreign Relations

The Cold War was an important factor affecting the international relations from the end of World War II to early 1990s. After World War II, Egypt became a focus of the competition between the two

superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. As early as the 1950s, the US attempted to include Egypt in its Middle East defense plan so as to contain the Soviet Union but was rejected by Egypt. During the Suez Crisis, the US put great pressure on Egypt instead of supporting this strategic ally. The main reason was that the US feared that the Soviet Union might take advantage of this opportunity to get in the Middle East. Former American president Dwight Eisenhower said, ”We should put forward the best thinking for problems likely to be solved; in particular, the rescue mission of helping Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria out of their failure under the control of the Soviet Union... Since Britain and France have lost their influence in the Middle East, to save these countries and make them turn to the West, we must dare to be the leader” (Warner, 1991:316). However, the US failed to render Egypt much real help. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union opened the Egyptian gate through economic and military aid, making Egypt a tower of strength of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. In contrast, Egypt and the US fell apart and finally broke off their diplomatic relationship in 1967. Although the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union developed rapidly after the Six-Day War, the role of the US played in tackling the Palestine-Israeli conflict reduced Egypt’s

confidence in the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was no surprise that Nasser improved the Egyptian-US relations in his late years. After taking office, Sadat tried his best to enhance the Egyptian-US relationship. The US made it one prerequisite that Egypt should stay away from the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that Egypt managed to launch the Yom Kippur War and won some victory at the

beginning of the war by relying on the weapons provided by the Soviet Union, Sadat had no confidence in the Soviet Union any longer. Consequently, the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate and finally broke up. Egypt started to put its total reliance on the US. The fight between the US and the Soviet Union in Egypt ended with a US victory and Egypt became a strategic ally of the US in the Middle East. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union

was in a disadvantageous position in its confrontation with the US. Although Egypt recovered its diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union in 1984, the bilateral tie could not be compared with what it used to be. The Egyptian-US relationship moved forward steadily. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the weakened Russia had not much strength to compete with the US. As a result, the Egyptian-US relationship continued to develop while the Egyptian-Russian relationship lost its dominance in Egypt’s foreign strategy. As of the 1990s, under the influence of the Cold War, the foreign relations of Egypt had been in the shadow of US-Soviet confrontation. The US and the Soviet Union were rather active during the Suez War of 1956. During the Yemeni Civil War, the republicans and the royalists were at daggers drawn; the two sides were supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia respectively. It happened that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were supported by the Soviet Union and the US respectively. The Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War appeared to be the confrontation between the Arab world and Israel, which actually was the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union backed Egypt while the US backed Israel. The Yom Kippur War was actually a grand contest of Soviet weapons versus American weapons. The failure of Arab countries led by Egypt during the two wars indicated that the US had the upper hand in its

contest against the Soviet Union in the Middle East. During the Yom Kippur and afterward, the US made a lot of efforts to mediate between Egypt and Israel, with another purpose of keeping the Soviet Union away. To prevent Egypt’s Third Army from being wiped out, the US put great pressure on Israel, saying, “if Israel did not raise its siege of this army, the Soviet Union would have an excuse to dispatch troops to the Middle East. All in all, Israel must immediately open the logistics channels of Egypt’s Third Army” (Zhang, & Zhao, 1987:234). After the Yom Kippur War, Egypt told the US that Egypt would like to help clean up the Suez Canal, which incurred the disapproval of the

Soviet Union. On May 24, 1974, an Arabic radio station in Moscow said, “some Americans are attempting to pressure Egypt with the demilitarization of the Suez Canal as an excuse so as to limit the navigation freedom of Soviet ships” (Hussini, 1987:205). Likely, the peace process between Egypt and Israel could not avoid the contest between the US and the Soviet Union. Once a US State Department spokesman of the Reagan administration, pointed out that the Camp David peace process and the fight against the Soviet threat in the Middle East was complementary to each other (Chen, 2005: 98). Obviously, although Egypt had been consistent in its neutral and non-aligned policy, Egypt had to rely on one side against the background of the Cold War. “In the global political zero-sum game played by the two superpowers in the 1950s, Washington believed that Egypt’s non-aligned policy diminished the strength of the West in a key strategic region (the Middle East), calling Egypt a traitor. In contrast, Egypt considered the Baghdad Pact, which included Britain and Iraq, to Egypt’s adversary, be an alliance against Egypt. Due to its objection to the West Camp which supported the establishment of the military advantage of Israel, Egypt turned to the East Camp for

weapons” (Lefebvre, 1993:325), said Jeffrey A. Lefebvre. The evolution of the Egyptian-US relationship had an impact on the evolution of the Egyptian-Soviet Union relationship and vice versa. “At that time (during Nasser’s reign), to make any change in Egyptian policies was considered to be undermining the position of the US because the starting point of the American position was to ensure the relations between Egypt and the West stay as they used to be. Therefore, the policy changes of Egypt always led to mutual estrangement between Egypt and the US. Meanwhile, this would always push Egypt toward the Soviet Union a little bit more, which then led to more contacts

between Egypt and the Soviet Union. It was said that Egypt had become a doorway through which the Soviet Union could easily get into the Middle East,” said Sadat (Sadat, & Zhong, 1976:76).

IV. Leaders: Personal Traits in Egypt’s Foreign Relations

According to the 1956, 1958, 1964 Constitutions and the 1971 permanent Constitution as well as its amendments, Egypt is a presidential republic where the president has been dominating the political life of the country. When making foreign policies, the president almost has absolute decision-making power. Some researchers believe that decision-making of foreign policies is a proprietary territory of the Egyptian president and his courtiers (Wang, 2006:32). The power like that of a king and the unique position in foreign policy making of the Egyptian president marked Egypt’s foreign relations with the individualities of the president himself. During Nasser’s reign, Egypt gave extensive support to the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa because Nasser himself hated colonialism and imperialism. He took part in the Palestine War of 1948. The humiliation of the defeat of Arab countries made up his mind to fight against Zionism and devote himself to the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Out of his sense of responsibility for the Arab nation, He was keen about the Arab unification. He precipitated the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958, also known as the United Arab

Republic. He also worked hard to expand Egypt’s influence in the Arab world and supported Arab revolutions. Taking Egypt as an example, many other Arab countries organized free officers

movements and launched revolutions. Egypt was hailed as the source of Arab revolutions.

When Sadat took office, he had no confidence in developing a relationship with the Soviet Union because he disgusted and distrusted it. The relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union

worsened steadily. Ismail Fahmy, once Foreign Minister of Egypt, said that Sadat”, never understood, liked or trusted Russians and Russians treated him the same way” (Fahmy, 1983:11). In contrast, Sadat liked the American leaders; he had full confidence in President Carter,

regarding him as a friend the Egyptian people and could be relied on. Therefore, he welcomed Carter’s mediation in the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks with open arms, which led to big breakthroughs in and rapid development of the Egyptian-US relationship. Sadat liked to act in an arbitrary fashion and discriminated against those with different views. He often made big decisions by himself. It was said “when faced with important problems, he would return to his place and stay there for a couple of days. He did not like to read memos or reports. He liked to surprise his assistants. His advisors called him a Pharaoh in private” (Karawan, 1994: 257). Former American President Nixon once described him as a person who liked to think, and to be alone. He seldom exchanged views with

his ministers. Many important decisions were made when he was walking alone along the Nile after lunch (Nixon, 1983: 340). Sadat often made unexpected decisions which he called “lightening shock

strategy” (Karawan, 1994:256). This made many foreign policies that he decided during his tenure often surprising. For instance, in 1971 he made the decision to join the Libyan-Syrian Federation. Only two people knew about his decision of driving out the Soviet experts, which was only made several hours before the Soviet ambassador got the notice. The time of launching the Yom Kippur War was decided after his discussion with Syrian President Hafez Assad and only his senior officers were notified about this. The decision of his visit to Jerusalem was also his personal decision. Only Hasan Tuhami, the Deputy Prime Minister, knew about this decision before he declared this to the People’s Assembly. The personality and the position in foreign policy decision-making of Sadat played an enormous role in Egypt’s foreign relations especially in the breakthroughs of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. Ephraim Dowek, former Israeli ambassador to Cairo, commented, “No doubt, he is a major peace maker. Without his vision, determination, willingness of risking himself and the nation and his evaluation of the short-term and long-term historical process, it would be unthinkable for our generation to realize peace with Egypt” (Dowek, 2001:282). Mubarak also held in hand the power of foreign policy decision-making. After he became president of Egypt, the Egyptian National Security Council seldom held meetings. Interestingly, the Council was responsible for making relevant national security strategy and handling important problems concerning national security.

Mubarak preferred to consult the courtiers and associates around him. After serving the army for a long time, Mubarak developed a character of determination and following orders. After the assassination of Sadat, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process was fragile. Mubarak did not hesitate to let the peace process continue. However, he did not think well of most Israeli leaders. For example, he disliked Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, whom he took to be “uncompromising and dogmatic”, “an enemy of peace and an obstacle of Egypt’s goals in this region” (Dowek, 2001: 290). Therefore, he insisted on not meeting with Shamir at any place and waited for the change of the Israeli administration. Later on, he strongly condemned Israeli Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Sharon. He distrusted them so he met with them as seldom as possible. For instance, Mubarak did not invite Sharon to visit Egypt until a long time after the latter took office in 2001. Even during the Rabin administration and the Barak administration when the Egyptian-Israeli relationship improved, Egypt did not hold back its criticism on Israeli leaders. Mubarak always refused to visit Israel (the only exception was his participation in the funeral of Prime Minister Rabin). To sum up, the

Egyptian-Israeli relationship stayed I n a cold peace situation for quite a long time. It is thus clear that the presidential system and the unique decision-making mechanism of Egypt stamped Egypt’s foreign relations with a brand of Egyptian leaders. The personality traits of the leaders influenced the development of Egypt’s foreign relations to some extent. However, it must be pointed out that despite the influence of the sentiment of Egyptian leaders what determines the essence of Egypt’s foreign relations is still the national interests of Egypt. To sum up, geography, interests, the Cold War and Egyptian leaders are four fundamental starting points toward understanding Egypt’s foreign relations. Geography is the basis of Egypt’s foreign relations; it sets the fundamental directions on Egypt’s foreign relations: the Arab world, Israel, great powers, Europe and Africa. Although safeguarding its national interests is a fundamental starting point in Egypt’s foreign relations, its national interests have shown different points of emphasis at different stages. Additionally, Egypt still bears the mission of protecting the interests of the Arab nation. The Cold War had great influences on many aspects of Egypt’s foreign relations; the United States and the Soviet Union were top priority in its foreign relations before the 1990s. Under the unique political mechanism of Egypt, the Egyptian leaders have supreme power in foreign policy decision-making thus Egypt’s foreign relations were stamped with a brand of Egyptian leaders.

In retrospect of the evolution of Egypt’s foreign relations over the past half century, Egypt’s foreign relations had different points of emphasis at different times and Egypt’s relations with other countries were also different from one another. Generally speaking, Israel had the greatest influence on the national security of Egypt. Egypt paid close attention to its relationship with Israel. However, the bilateral relationship did not develop steadily because of Arab factors. Therefore, it stayed at a relatively low level. The Arab world is a platform on which Egypt can bring into play its role in the region. Egypt and other Arab countries had close political and cultural ties but their economic relationship stayed at a low level. For this reason, although the economic and trade relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia developed rapidly, it stayed at a low level as a whole. From the 1950s to early 1970s, Egypt maintained a rather high level of relationship with the Soviet Union. Then the bilateral relationship deteriorated quickly and finally broke up. After the recovery of diplomatic tie between Egypt and the Soviet Union in 1984, the bilateral relationship did not make much progress. The Egyptian-Russian relationship also stayed at a relatively low level. From the 1950s to early 1970s, Egypt kept a cold relationship with the US. During this period of time, the relationship between Egypt and Europe also stayed at a relatively low level. However, the relationship between Egypt and member states of the European Communities（the European Union）developed very fast. Although Africa had been a traditional diplomatic field of Egypt, the relationship between Egypt and Africa stayed at a low level because of the overall situation of Africa. Recently, the Egyptian political situation is in ups and downs. There have been anti-government protests at the end of January 2011. The president Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign on February 11 and the Supreme Council of the armed forces took over state power in Egypt. The constitutional amendment released on February 27^th requires that the President's term of office is four years and only one consecutive term. Nabil el-Araby has been the new foreign minister during the new government led by Essam Sharaf who has taken into office on the March 8. These changes will inevitably lead to the adjustment of domestic and foreign policies in Egypt. However, it is believed that geography, interests and leaders are the basic focus of external relations of Egypt, so Egyptian foreign relations pattern is unlikely to have dramatic changes. First, the Egyptian-US relations will continue to develop. The United States has provided substantial long-term economic and military aid. During the political changes in Egypt, the Egyptian military had close cooperation with the US and had also got their supports, in the future they also need the support of the United States. Meanwhile, the Middle East strategy of the United States also needs help from Egypt. Therefore, the development of Egyptian-US relations is mutual request. Second, peaceful relations with Israel will not change. This kind of peace is critical not only for Egypt, but also for Israel as well as the United States. The three countries have been in line with the fundamental interests. The Supreme Council of the Egyptian armed forces has promised to abide by all signed international and regional treaties which means Egypt will continue to maintain peaceful relations with Israel. Israel has also given a positive response. Third, the new constitutional amendment just modified the conditions of the president's campaign and terms of office and did not have too many restrictions on its power. In the future, the President of Egypt is still in a strong and dominant position in foreign policy. Of course, there would be some adjustments in specific external relations.

SOUTH AFRICAS FOREIGN POLICY

As part of post-war developments and the new political dispensation after a regime change in 1994, South Africa regained its international stature on the continent and further afield. Based on its phenomenal political recovery, and resourcefulness and capacity (though both limited), the post-apartheid South African government has pledged and is therefore expected to help develop the African continent. This commitment is well mirrored in its foreign policy, which strives for regional and African recovery and seeks to champion the cause of the South at large. Since 1994, South Africa has played a critical role in Africa. On multilateral grounds, the country has been preponderant in the development of SADC, the AU and other African multilateral institutions. For this research, three areas of development were considered: human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. Its human rights role, although mired in controversy – accusations of befriending and defending human rights abusers – has been fairly significant, at least on paper. With regard to peace and security, South Africa continues its peacekeeping efforts in several African countries by devoting its resources

to peace missions under SADC, the AU and the UN. Notwithstanding the perceived aggressiveness in its asymmetrical trade relations with the rest of the region, South Africa has contributed largely to continental economic development through its foreign direct investment. It is against the background of its continental foreign policy and actual role that this research attempts to investigate whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon on the continent. This facet of South Africa’s post-1994 foreign

policy towards and its role in Africa has been widely debated by political 200 observers. Some political commentators contend that South Africa is a continental partner while others conclude it is just a selfish hegemon and a “bully”. Moreover, due to its post-1994 role on the continent, others suggest South Africa shares characteristics of both a partner and a selfish hegemon.

This assertion particularly subscribes to the view that while South Africa may claim to be a partner, it is in reality seen to be an aggressive hegemon in its trade relations with the region; a viewpoint reinforced by the fact that South Africa, lying somewhere between the developed and developing worlds, should primarily be regarded as an emerging, middle-income country. The purpose of this study has been to provide an overview of South Africa’s foreign policy towards and its role on the African continent. This was done in order to determine whether South Africa should be regarded as a

partner or hegemon. This research goal was based on the post-1994 South African government’s perceived need to embark on the promotion of respect for human rights, peace and security assurances, and economic development on the African continent. Consequently, South Africa’s foreign policy and the conception of its role on the continent has been a cause for disagreement.

To facilitate this study, the following research question was formulated: “What is the foreign policy of South Africa towards and its role on the African continent: partner or hegemon?”

The discussion on the “partner/hegemon” question is based on the literature on South Africa’s foreign policy and its role on the continent. This debate suggests that the country’s foreign policy is marked by contradictory concepts, arguments, and normative principles. Having observed the eclectic quality of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa, Davies (1992) suggests there is one of two courses that the country could follow. It could pursue regional integration driven by hegemonic ambitions and egocentrism while favouring some of its lesser neighbours, or it might pursue the so-called “nonhegemonic regional co-operation and integration” mandate. Schoeman (2007) holds an almost similar sentiment. South Africa is not an exclusive partner nor is it a complete hegemon. South Africa finds itself somewhere in-between. This is because the country has shown hegemonic aspirations through its multilateral socio-political leadership and economic aggressiveness while simultaneously maintaining that it is willing to act as a partner without any hegemonic ambitions. Other than that, Habib and Selinyane (2004) suggest that South Africa should assume a hegemonic role. The region needs a leader capable of addressing socio-political and security issues with economic rewards that promise a tenable stability. This will eventually restore Africa’s stature in the international sphere. As a result of these contradicting concepts, the problem statement of the study is founded on the controversy surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy identity and its eventual role on the African

continent. In order to assess South Africa’s foreign policy and role, the study was conceptually demarcated by determining whether South Africa can best be associated with a concept of partnership or hegemony. Moreover, the study was geopolitically confined to South Africa and the African continent. South Africa’s representation as a major African power and of the developing South

on the UNSC was also considered. As far as temporal demarcation is concerned, the study was limited to South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa from 1994 to 2010, although some pre-1994 foreign policy events were broadly considered as background information with regard to the South Africa- Africa policy.

The study descriptively analysed the relationship between South Africa and other African countries via an “inside-out” approach; discussing South Africa’s foreign policy processes both by involvement of state and non-state actors at national level, and eventually evaluating their roles on the continent

and further afield. Generally, the study examined and portrayed the foreign policy relations of South Africa with other African states. It is a descriptive analysis based on a literature study aimed at working towards explanations on why South Africa, among many other policy issues and choices, decided to prioritise human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. All the data in the study was acquired from primary (state documents), literature sources, and secondary analytical and scholarly sources. The significance of the study is that the findings can be used to inform foreign policy actors and observers about South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. The answers to the research question can help to clarify and better understand the country’s policies and international expectations on the South Africa-Africa relations. Regarding the conceptual controversy surrounding

South Africa’s role on the continent, the study helps determine whether the country epitomises a partner or hegemon. In view of the above, the main aim of chapter two was to conceptualise

terms that are frequently used in IR, particularly those often used in the study. The chapter commenced by conceptualising “foreign policy”, “national interests” and “state and non-states actors”, “partner” and “hegemony”, and “multilateralism”. In this regard, a state-centric, classical realist interpretation defines foreign policy as aims pursued by a state as the only actor in foreign policymaking, while liberal-pluralism interprets “foreign policy” as being developed by both

state and non-state actors. The study found that foreign policy is representative of national interests, not only of state actors’ interests, but also of those of non-state actors. Such national interests may be economic, political or social, or even more than that. Furthermore, foreign policy-related

roles cannot be entirely attributed to the state but to NGOs as well. The study also shown that foreign policymaking is a lengthy process that involves at least five stages: agenda-setting/problem presentation, opinion generation, policy design, implementation, and policy review. Moreover, the

foreign policy of a state is developed with the view to ensure security domestically and abroad; achieve and enhance national prosperity; earn status and prestige in the international arena; and ensure and maintain the autonomy of the state in question.With regard to “national interests”, liberalism would presecribe that “national interests” are no longer relevant to the contemporary political environment, while others contend that the phrase only involves the aspirations of the leading elite and not those of the public. However, the research reveals that “national interests” is a “measuring stick” since it only distinguishes national policies from foreign ones. The phrase specifically shows that certain pursued goals actually arise from people’s interests. The research has also shown that sovereign territorial states as well as the intergovernmental organisations that they have developed are all state actors, who together, constitute the community of nations. Such intergovernmental institutions in the African context include the SADC, the AU, NEPAD, and

others. Non-states actors are those actors that indirectly engage in foreign policymaking. By way of embodiment, non-governmental organisations include liberation movements, terrorist groups, TSMs, MNCs, and ordinary individuals. The research showed that the concept of a “partner” refers to a

“friendly” political, economic, or military actor with two or more international actors such as states, MNCs, and so on. A partner shares similar aims and objectives with fellow partners and is characterised by tolerance and commitment but there is no guarantee of equality among partners. The study further revealed that a hegemon is an actor that is economically and militarily powerful, and that plays a firm and influential leadership role within the region, continent, or the world in general. A hegemon may be a leading actor or organisation but it can sometimes be monopolistic. Chapter three of the study was aimed at discussing South Africa’s foreign policymaking. In this regard, the research demonstrated that South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 has been guided by a belief in the respect for human rights; promotion of global democracy; upholding of international law in international relations; promotion of international peace; development of African interests; and economic development. With regard to foreign policy decision-making, the study indicated that the president is one of the actors involved and he is the primary player that takes foreign policy decisions in South Africa. Having mentioned that, this does not signify that he/she is the sole actor involved in the process. However, a president can have a major influence on foreign policy and in determining

whether South Africa embraces partnership or hegemonic tendencies towards the continent. For instance, former President Mbeki was involved in the promulgation of the concept of the “African Renaissance” and the NEPAD programme. During his presidential terms, former President Mbeki supported multilateral solutions to regional conflicts and further deployed peacekeepers abroad. He also played an extraordinary role in NAM, the AU and the UNSC. Moreover, the research determined that other actors or specifically government departments that contribute directly or indirectly to foreign policy (formulation and implementation) include DIRCO through the minister in charge, South Africa’s diplomats and ambassadors, the DOD and the DTI. The DOD, through the SANDF, has been involved in conflict prevention, peace building, and peacekeeping in African countries such as Burundi, the DRC, and others. This shows the practical role and relevance of the DOD/SANDF on the issue of South Africa being a partner or a hegemon. The research further indicated that Parliament and civil society are other actors also indirectly involved in foreign policymaking. The contribution of various foreign policy actors to foreign policy decision-making differs greatly, depending on each actor’s relevance to the process. The main aim of chapter four was to explore South Africa’s multilateral relations on the African continent. The research on South Africa’s multilateralism in Africa emphasised its role in multilateral organisations on the continent. Notwithstanding the criticism that South Africa failed to influence SADC’s Organ on Politics, and Defence and Security controlled by

Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, the country continues to play a leading role in SADC. The study showed that South Africa has been one of key players in the rejuvenation of the SADC. In fact, the country is also responsible for coordinating the Finance and Investment sector in the SADC. It bases its regional role on the principles of equality and symbiotic partnership; nonhegemonic tendencies; and partnership as the means accomplishing its policy goals. The study disclosed that expectations are generally high amongst African governments for South Africa’s cooperation with its regional

counterparts as a partner and ally to ensure mutual and symbiotic economic and political relations. The country led the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government at which the need to establish the FTA was emphasised, and several agreements were signed. The study showed that South Africa’s Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels while the Departments of Customs and Excise (fixed three instances), and Trade and Industry collect the most duties and monitor SACU in that order. However, some maintain that South Africa’s participation in SACU is characterised by inconsistencies and economic supremacy. The country in the past has often been regarded as “imperialist” and a “malevolent hegemonic power”, and is currently reported to be a

“benign” regional hegemon. Most recently at the 2010 summit, SACU members registered their dissatisfaction about regional trade imbalances, marked by biased trade tendencies and protectionism, which hamper regional industrialisation endeavours. Furthermore, SACU members threatened that they would leave the union if South Africa failed to address regional trade imbalances. For this reason, research findings prove that South Africa cannot be regarded as a “partner” in the union; rather it showed itself to be an economic hegemon – at least in some instances.

At the AU level, the study revealed that the South African government has since 1994 expressed its commitment to cooperate as “equals” with its African counterparts and eschewed any hegemonic ambitions under the watchful eyes of the AU. Since then, the country has sought to build partnerships and alliances with other African states. South Africa is also expected to champion the cause of the continent and of the South at large, in spite of the accusation of some African states that South Africa may be guilty of alleged hegemonic tendencies. Illustratively, in the early 2000s, the Mbeki Administration was predominant in re-outlining the AU’s goals and objectives. Nevertheless, the

government was criticised for considering the interests of some states while ignoring those of others’ in the AU. However, South Africa stated the need to intensify the AU’s participation in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, particularly on peace support operations in conflict-stricken

countries in Africa, emphasising the importance of human security and social justice instead of military-defined state security. Research pertaining to South Africa’s role in NEPAD demonstrated that the plan largely reflects former President Mbeki’s development ideas, embodying the country’s leadership role on this continental multilateral platform. South Africa’s commitment to the development of NEPAD is guided by its belief in accountability, ownership, and partnership. South Africa’s role in NEPAD has been significant since the country has managed to coax many

African countries to join NEPAD. Based on the transformation of African governments, the study showed that the Mbeki government played a crucial role in the expansion of the APRM. For the purpose of peer review, the South African government launched and conducted its annual Peer Review Mechanism in 2005 under former President Mbeki. Investigations show that South Africa under the Mbeki Administration played and continues to play a significant role in developing and promoting the African Renaissance ideal. The Mbeki government has always avoided

being conceived of as hegemon in its endeavours to disseminate the “African agenda”, despite allegations by some international actors in this regard. The research further showed that South Africa represented Africa and the South on a non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2006, which was informed by its peace and security management experience particularly in Africa. It also

accepted the “rotating” chairmanship on the UNSC in 2008. In October 2010, the country won another non-permanent seat for the 2011 to 2012 period. South Africa’s approach is counter-hegemonic but simultaneously, it does not intend to be a mere “team-player” in international politics, particularly in

Africa. Many believe however, that it has automatically become a “stateleadership” hegemon since it professes to represent Africa and the South in the UNSC. Chapter five of the study was aimed at addressing South Africa’s Africa foreign policy issues in the post-1994 period with reference to human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. From the perspective of human rights, the research also revealed that South Africa was proclaimed one of the dominant actors in the promulgation

of international human rights law at the UN level. However, some argue that South Africa is paradoxical, rhetorical, and ambiguous in its approach to human rights. The gap between the principle and practice of human rights perhaps stands out clearer than in any other areas, proving to be “uneven”. For instance, South Africa often disapproved of international criticism of human rights abusers such as the governments of Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Iran. For this reason, the study maintains that South Africa is not a hegemon with regard to international human rights, neither in Africa, nor in the rest of the world. In fact, South Africa has recently received more criticism than

applause in this field. In practice, the country is not a leading hegemon, but merely a typical partner with an average sense of political morality when it comes to the international promotion of respect for human rights. Some observers even consider South Africa as a human rights actor incapable of

taking moral responsibility to successfully address international human rights issues in both Africa and further afield. Relating to peace and security, the research indicated that the South African government has shown its willingness to offer assistance for transforming Africa into a stable “zone of peace” through democratisation. It has promised to participate in the AU-led continental cooperation and development, peace, security, and stability efforts, all in the name of the country’s national interests and the UN’s political and operational objectives. The country has shown its willingness to participate in the African peacekeeping missions as can be deduced from its involvement over many

years in peace missions and negotiations in African countries such as Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Eritrea(-Ethiopia), Lesotho, Somalia and Sudan, through the SANDF and other actors. The SANDF’s involvement in peacekeeping missions has certainly improved the country’s

reputation in Africa and in the international arena. Although some contend that South Africa, based on its military power, is a potential regional superpower that can tender “its engine to pull Africa out” of conflicts, some argue that it has always been an African military hegemonic power. Its military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 illustrated its aggressive and hegemonic behaviour. Many interpreted South Africa’s rather aggressive intervention in Lesotho as proof of its hegemonic (leadership) ambition. However, South Africa’s participation in recent African peace efforts on the continent has not reached the level where it can be coined as hegemonic. South Africa has nevertheless emerged as one of the most prominent players in the continent’s peace and security missions since it is well resourced, capacitated, and experienced. However, one needs to indicate that although the South African military is one of the most capable forces in the African context – which might imply to some

observers that South Africa is a potential military hegemon – the country is still short of the legitimacy and capacity to act as a political-military hegemon on the continent. With regard to economic issues, the research findings in the last section of chapter five showed that South Africa’s trade relations with the region, as hinted earlier in the research findings on the country’s role in SACU, are rather asymmetrical. It also showed that trade benefits are uneven and skewed in favour of South Africa, resulting in trade imbalances with the rest of the continent. Such imbalances stirred criticism against South Africa, that it is a selfish hegemon intending to pursue its national interests at the cost of weak and under-resourced African states. The country is confronted by a stern challenge since it fails to implement the stipulations in its economic and trade policies. This demonstrates why its foreign policy documents prescribe partnership and alliance with the region on the one hand, but reflects huge economic and trade imbalances between South Africa and its neighbours on the other. In the end, South Africa-Southern Africa economic partnership does not necessarily mean equal economic power; that is, emerging middle economic powers can still forge trade relations with low-income countries despite unequal levels of economic development. Admittedly, there are often trade imbalances when middle-income countries such as South Africa trade with less-developed countries in its neighbourhood. In spite of such trade gaps, the South African government continues to reject alleged hegemonic aspirations.                                                                                                 Conclusions

With regard to the main research question, three subsidiary questions were asked:

• How does South Africa define its foreign identity with particular reference to its role on the African continent and further afield?

• What are the regional and continental expectations with regard to South Africa’s role in Africa?

• Is South Africa willing to be a leader or an ordinary actor within the multilateral (African) context?

The following conclusions can finally be articulated in the context of the research question and subsidiary questions. How does South Africa define its foreign identity with particular reference

to its role on the African continent and further afield?

Although apartheid South Africa did not have much interest in Africa, the foreign policy of the democratic, post-1994 South African government proved to be Africa-oriented in nature. Furthermore, Nelson Mandela, even before being inaugurated as President, often reiterated that South Africa’s postapartheid foreign policy specifically with regard to Africa would be guided by the country’s commitment to the promotion of the principle of respect for human rights. It can be safely asserted that the country’s resolve to address human rights issues was informed by its socio-political history. For this reason, South Africa’s advocacy led to a situation where human rights issues

dominated its foreign policy agenda in Africa. This obsession with human rights promotion further led to South Africa earning itself the title “Beacon of Hope” due to its commitment, at least in principle, to African human rights issues. South Africa sharply condemned the execution of Nigerian human

rights activists including Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995. Over the years, the country has also deployed its troops, under the auspices of the SADC and the AU, with the view to curb human rights abuses and ensure human security and stability in African conflict-stricken countries. However, South Africa continues to be denounced for its failure to condemn and effectively help address human rights abuses in countries such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Many argue that South Africa is gradually compromising its foreign principles by adopting the so-called “quiet diplomacy” towards some African (and even non- African) countries notorious for human rights violations. With Thabo Mbeki taking over as President of the Republic, South Africa’s “Africanness” continued through slogans such as “I am an African”. However, specifically, South Africa’s foreign policy focus in Africa indirectly took a gradual shift to economic issues losing sight of human rights support hence the ignorance of blatant human rights abuses in 2008. Currently, South Africa’s foreign policy, based on practical circumstances, is gradually becoming dominated by economic issues. This point is manifested by the

Mbeki Administration’s leading role in economy-oriented institutions such as NEPAD while keeping “quiet” when it comes to continental human rights issues.

However, most observers argue that South Africa does not have a clear foreign identity in Africa; perhaps this is due to ambiguities, inconsistencies, and paradoxes that characterise its foreign policy and eventually its role in Africa.

What are the regional and continental expectations with regard to South Africa’s role in Africa?

The entire continent expects (more of) a leadership role from South Africa. One of the reasons for such optimism is that South Africa is the most resourced, capacitated, developed and well-governed country on the continent. Other than that, at the dawn of democracy in South Africa, the government made a series of promises with regard to its role on the continent. This might have sparked African countries’ hopes pertaining to South Africa’s continental role. As soon as the democratic dispensation was brought into effect, or even before then, the South African post-apartheid government was

already making development promises to fellow African states. By way of illustration, former President Mandela frequently emphasised, even in a foreign policy-related academic article published in 1993, that democratic South Africa would take up a leadership position but avoid hegemonic attitudes in Africa. Additionally, the ANC’s Foreign Policy Discussion Document further accentuates that it would be unrealistic for South Africa to “think” that it would enter a possibly prosperous future in isolation from its African neighbours. The document maintains that South Africa intends to strengthen its ties with Africa. This is because South Africa is intrinsically and inextricably linked with the African continent, geographically and otherwise. Once again, these represent some of the factors that raised poor African states’ expectations of South Africa. Although countries such as Nigeria seem to be critical towards South Africa, some African countries, and even the West, still vest the responsibility

of African development in South Africa as Africa’s leading economy. Africa, particularly, expects South Africa to make a significant contribution in many development areas. Currently, South Africa is expected to address human rights violations in countries such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland via mediation or any other related effective means, other than quiet diplomacy. The country is also expected to make an economic contribution to African development through trade (foreign direct investment) while simultaneously ensuring that trade relations and benefits are even and symbiotic. Furthermore, it is important for South Africa to contribute in a form of material resources, finance, deployment of more troops to conflict-stricken and under-resourced countries, and others. The country is also expected to be a more assertive leader in the development of African multilateral political institutions such as the ADC, the AU, NEPAD, and others.

Is South Africa willing to be a leader or an ordinary actor within the multilateral (African) context?

The Mbeki Administration, more than any other South African governments, declared and often emphasised its favouritism for multilateralism over unilateralism. In fact, the need for multilateralism has been one of the predominant items in South Africa’s foreign agenda and approach towards its relations with Africa since the late 1990s. The country contends that multilateral relations are more effective than bilateralism and unilateralism when it comes to regional development. South Africa’s

preference for multilateralism is well mirrored in the Foreign Policy Discussion Document and DIRCO’s annual strategic plans. In these documents, the South African government, again, continues to reflect its keenness to be a leader and not just an ordinary player particularly in African multilateral

institutions. The Mbeki government, by way of embodiment, played a principal part in the establishment of NEPAD. South Africa’s role in the founding and consolidation of NEPAD gave birth to claims that NEPAD is a complete reflection of former President Mbeki’s vision and development plans, and today NEPAD is largely considered a South African product. South Africa was also one of the key actors in the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union. Additionally, South Africa holds the honour of being the first country to chair the “new” AU in the early 2000s. South Africa has also played a leadership role in the SADC, particularly in the reshaping and

restructuring of the organisation, in coordinating the Finance and Investment sector within this organisation, and in having chaired the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government in 2008. In spite of “imperialist” accusations that have been levelled at South Africa in SACU, the study reveals that South Africa’s Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels while

the Departments of Customs and Excise, and Trade and Industry collect most duties and coordinate SACU respectively. Moreover, South Africa has shown its leadership role as a representative of Africa and the South on the UNSC. In fact, the country has recently won its second non-permanent seat for the 2011-2012 term on the council with an overwhelming majority of 182 out of 192 votes.

One can therefore conclude that South Africa is willing to be a leader in Africa’s multilateral context and not a mere team player. Finally, based on the above discussion, it is recommended that the South African government be transparent and democratic (the public must be informed of any decisions made) in its foreign policymaking processes. The second recommendation would be that, the government ought to revise its policy priorities. It must be known whether South Africa’s first priority is human rights or economic development; recently, the country has prioritised human

rights issues on paper while it remains preoccupied with economic or trade relations issues in practice in Africa. The third recommendation concerns foreign policy identity. South Africa needs to redefine its foreign identity. For example, it allies with both human rights advocates and abusers at the same time. That makes it difficult to determine exactly who South Africa is in the international sphere. The last recommendation would concern the partner/hegemon issue. Currently, South Africa’s position is somewhere between a partner and a hegemon. It needs to redefine its policy goals not only at the formulation level but also at the implementation phase. It needs to determine whether it wants to be either an exclusive partner or a hegemon, another aspect that concerns foreign policy identity.

KEYAN FOREIGN POLICY

As one of the riparian states, the use of the Nile water by neighbouring countries has direct implications for Kenya’s national interest. The evolution of Kenya’s official water policy, particularly on the Nile River question, has been slow and ambiguous.

The Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Kenya for example, only directed the Government to prioritise its policies on poverty, illiteracy and diseases, with a special focus on water and sanitation services. Even Kenya’s Constitution as well as the recently concluded 2004 draft constitution do not provide for water rights. Article 67 of the draft Constitution stipulates in part (Kenya 2004a): Every person has the right: (a) to an environment that is safe for life and health; (b) to

have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through legislative and other measures that (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; and (ii) promote conservation; and secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting economic and social development...

It was not until 1974 that the Government established the Ministry of Water Development. The issues relating to water policy were originally under the docket of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, a number of policies and development programmes have been put in place, particularly since the 1990s, in an attempt to synchronise and harmonise the country’s national needs as well as to ensure a clear understanding of the implications of the Nile water policies pursued by the neighbouring states. The Nile River basin is shared by Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda and encompasses a total population of 160 million people. Of the ten riparian states, only Egypt and Kenya are not among the least developed countries.

 Operational Research Questions

(i) Are Kenya’s foreign policy interests vis-à-vis the Nile River question influenced by her internal demand for water?

(ii) Is Kenya’s foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis the Nile River question influenced not only by her internal demand for water but also the demand for water by the riparian states? Stability in the region is in the interest of the riparian countries, including Kenya.As a sovereign independent state, Kenya, like the other riparian states, has the right to question the validity and relevance of treaties entered into by the colonial countries that hold the potential of undermining the national interest and creating instability in the region. The 1929 Nile River agreement entered into between Britain (the colonial power at the time) and Egypt on behalf of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, for example, remains a contentious issue for the riparian states.

(iii) To what extent do these regional geo-political interlocking questions influence Kenya’s foreign policy interests on the use of Nile water? The 1929 Nile River treaty provides that Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan cannot use the waters of Lake Victoria and the Nile without the acquiescence of Egypt.

Paragraph 27 of the treaty, for example, stipulates in part that: Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile or its branches or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would, in such manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.

The other key elements incorporated in the 1929 treaty, which have direct implications for Kenya’s national interest, include the following: (i) ‘The Nile Waters were to be shared between Egypt and Sudan, with Egypt and Sudan claiming rights to 48bn. m. and 4bn m. per year respectively.

(ii) The dry season flow, between the 15th January and 15th of July, was entirely reserved for Egypt.

(iii) Egypt claimed the right to monitor the flow of NileWater into and out of upstream riparian countries.

(iv) Egypt claimed the right to veto any upstream engineering works that would affect the flow of the Nile.

(v) Egypt claimed the right to construct engineering works on the Nile without the consent of other riparian states’ (Ng’wandu 2003).

This article examines Kenya’s foreign policy interests on the Nile water question and the implications of the geopolitics of the region as well as the riparian states’ policies for the country’s national interest. The article is divided into four parts. Part One puts into perspective the theoretical claims to rights over waters and international drainage systems by sovereign states with a special focus on the Nile River basin and the concomitant implications for Kenya’s national interest.Adrainage basin is defined as: ‘the entire area, known as a watershed, that contributes water both surface and underground, to the principal river, stream or lake or other common terminus. While the Nile and its tributaries flow directly into the Mediterranean Sea, Lake Victoria drains directly into the Nile, thus contributing water to that one terminus. Therefore the Lake Victoria Basin and the Nile basin contribute one drainage system’ (Okidi 1994: 9).

Part Two focuses on the domestic context of Kenya’s foreign policy interests in the Nile River basin. Part Three examines Kenya’s involvement in the multilateral initiatives in the Nile River basin by the riparian states and the impact of these on the country’s foreign policy interests. Part Four puts into context the impact of the Nile River basin geopolitics on Kenya’s foreign policy interests.

The outcome of an acceptable legal regime is contingent upon the willingness of the Nile basin countries to set aside their national interests for the general good of the region. Kenya’s proactive involvement in the NBI negotiations is a clear indication of

the perception of foreign policy-makers regarding the role the country needs to play vis-à-vis its national interests on the Nile River question. These developments and other internal and external factors are slowly influencing and transforming the geopolitical scenario in the Nile basin region. First, the end of the Cold War has ushered in a new epoch in global affairs, burying the so-called satellite states thesis inherent in the East-West bipolar system, with the Ethiopia-Somalia proxy war of 1977-78 serving as a good example in the region at the time. Second, the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), with a mandate to promote continental multilateral diplomacy and to guard against war crimes as well as the right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states if situations so warrant (as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of theAU), is laying the foundation for bilateral and multilateral ‘African solutions to African problems’ based on legalistic and normative values. As I have explained, the cases of

Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, and Sudan serve as good examples. Yet, the unresolved conflict in Darfur, which has claimed over 300,000 lives and displaced more than two million people remain contentious. The decision by government of Sudan to allow the

deployment of an expanded UN-backed African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeeping force in Darfur is a positive sign that could lead to the tangible resolution of conflict between the belligerent parties involving the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and

the (men on horses) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The perpetual instability in Somalia following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 still poses major challenges

for the Nile basin riparian states. Third, there is a shift towards what has been called a process of ‘dialogue accumulation’ by the riparian states that is ‘the result of numerous meetings between representatives from different conflict parties over the years in various formal and informal settings’ (Mason 2003: XVI). Countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia that originally adopted ambivalent attitudes in the negotiations have, since the establishment of the NBI, been fully involved in the process. Specifically, step-by-step

or project-by-project approaches and the identification of an underlying acceptable legal framework have accommodated the interests of the riparian states.

NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

The Nigerian nation is known as one, whose foreign policy is essentially tailored to reflect her commitment to the well-being of all African countries; particularly in the areas of peaceful coexistence, prevention of violent conflicts - at intra-national and international levels - restoration of peace where necessary; and maintenance of peace all over the world.

For the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to attempt a search into the rationale behind Nigeria‟s decision to make Africa the cornerstone of her foreign policy, since, according to J.A. Price in his book Political Institutions in West Africa,1 “the foreign policy of a State is liable to reflect the State’s personality, but foreign policy cannot be developed in a completely arbitrary manner, since policy is bound to be affected by many considerations concerned with the circumstances and internal problems of the State.” In the beginning …

Since 1960 when Nigeria got her political independence from the British colonial masters, notable about her diplomatic attitude has been the making of the African continent her focus, especially in the areas of enthronement of democracy and peace. This philosophy is derived from the fact of an African adage, which says that when tears fall from the eyes, the nose responds by sneezing. Literally speaking, apart from the philosophy of the „brother‟s keeper‟ which Nigeria has created for herself, it should also be noted that when any of her neighbouring countries, especially in the West African sub-region, has crisis, the Nigerian economy and political landscape are equally affected. Instances of this can be found in the era of Ghana‟s economic down-turn in 1980‟s and within 10 years, the civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone; which resulted in the influx of a large number of refugees into Nigeria. These, therefore, induced Nigeria‟s foreign policy formulators to see the need, not only to be steadfastly involved in policies aimed at maintaining peace and tranquility on the African continent in general, but in the West African sub-region in particular. It is reasonable to posit that Nigeria‟s policy on Africa had reflated some measure of consistency and attracted unprecedented domestic support, despite a few dissenting voices on its foreign policy decisions concerning Africa. This fact is confirmed by the nation‟s commitment to the decolonisation of Africa and the right of Africans to self-determination, with abundant national resources put at the disposal of implementors of policies of the government. Oyediran et al, (1966: pgs 150-168) stated, for instance, that Nigeria deployed her diplomatic prowess through global support such as direct bilateral financial and material aids to

the Liberation Movements across the continent. Typical of this, was the role Nigeria played in the liberation of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe], Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Angola and South Africa.

Another classic example of this „Afrocentric‟ policy of Nigeria by Oyediran was demonstrated in Nigeria‟s recognition of the then Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime in 1976. This was against the advice of the United States government among others. This was evident again in the acknowledgement of Nigeria as a fore-runner State in the

interventions for the emancipation of Namibia and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. Nigeria was undoubtedly a prevailing force on the then OAU, in the recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic sovereignty, thus signifying its loyalty to the right of Africans to self-determination; the attendant dismay expressed by some African governments and others notwithstanding. Reviewing the concept of Nigeria‟s African policy in a study of its role in the African unification movement by Okochi15, it was made clear that not all Nigerians supported the policy, although it could be said that those in support have consistently been in the majority and have always found their ways into governance and government of the day. Okochi was quick to state that the leader of the third political party in the first democratic era - Action Group – among those that formed the independent elite in the First Republic, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was not optimistic about the concept, hence he wondered what basis could be the essence of the African policy by Nigeria, if not to establish the “United States of Africa – USA.” While addressing the sixth yearly congress of the party, Awolowo opined that to labour for this kind of classical State would create distrust among the adjoining States, especially when the cultural differences still exist. He cited the instance of the location of Egypt in Africa with her heart in the Arab world, which he argued would make both political union and co-operation impossible. Significantly, Nigeria‟s relationships with other African countries could be said to be ever consistent. This fact revolves around co-operation at the bilateral level, beginning with the understanding of what co-operation is, especially at this level of discussion, which involves relations between two countries only; whether geographically aligned or distanced from each other. For instance, Okochi (1990, p. 57) wrote that in line with the directive of the first Prime Minister, the Nigerian government as at January 1966; had instituted foreign missions in about 20 nations. These included Algeria, Cameroon, Congo-Leopoldville, Benin Republic, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Chad, and Togo. Nigeria, with other near-by countries, reached an agreement on the abolition of visa for their citizens to use in travelling across the West African sub-region as a mark of good neighbourliness and as part of „diplomatic relations.‟ By 1964, Nigeria had this kind of agreement with six countries including Cameroon, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Togo and Morocco, while that of Guinea was formalised a year later, in 1965. It is relevant to note that the choice of Africa as the centre piece of Nigerian foreign policies, in the long run, was not a misguided step; as the decision was not intended to overrun smaller countries and assume a super-power status on the continent. In line with the vision of Balewa‟s administration from the First Republic of Nigeria till date, (up to President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua), it is very crucial for any government in power in the country to keep the flag flying for the benefit of the African race as re-affirmed by the recent past Nigerian Foreign Minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe. So, be it military or civilian government, as explained by former President Babangida, there is a need to sustain the tempo to encourage the kind of unified economic system currently seen and enjoyed in Europe as part of the European Union‟s (EU) vision of integration, in order to build upon the progress made so far. Above all, the unique saying that there is tremendous strength in unity should be emphasised and followed continuously.

 LIBYA FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy in Libya is, in theory, a facet of the Jamahiriya in which “the people are the instrument of governing.”6 In practice, however, the jamahiri system itself owes its conception to the intellectual vision of the Libyan leader, as it

developed during the first three years after the Great September Revolution in 1969. It was in April 1973 that the concept of Libya’s stateless state, driven by direct popular democracy, emerged, distilled, as it were, from the broader principles of Nasirist Arab nationalism in which the Revolution had been born. Thus those sources that informed the construction and operation of the Libyan political system also inform the intellectual project behind foreign policy. The Green Book, which emerged in stages between 1973 and 1976, is usually held to be the basic document defining the ideology that Colonel Qadhafi constructed in the 1970s to reorganize the Libyan state but it does not explicitly discuss foreign policy, either in terms of the principles that govern it or in terms of the objectives it seeks. The same is largely true of the Libyan ntellectual seminar, held in May 1970 and involving the Revolutionary Command Council and opinion-formers in Libya.7 Its five point agenda only touched on foreign affairs in its attention to Arab unity, itself an integral extension of the Nasirist agenda the Libyan revolution had espoused. We must therefore look elsewhere to appreciate what the principles behind Libya’s actions and decisions in foreign affairs may be. There is, in fact, very little domestic Libyan comment on the principles behind the country’s foreign policy concerns, most Libyan commentators being predominantly concerned with

domestic politics.8 Most Libyan commentators have focused on domestic issues or on the ideologicalimplications of the Libyan leader’s pronouncements and dicta9 on policy issues generally and few of these relate specifically to the

basic principles on which foreign policy has been constructed. Thus, together with concepts put forward in the Green Book, they have looked to the ideas emerging from the colonel’s vision of the “Third Universal Theory,” his alternative to

communism and capitalism as a global ideology, for inspiration. Rejecting the monopoly of both capital and labor as explicatory drivers, Colonel Qadhafi argued instead that human society and the polities emerging from it were driven by

nationalism and religion.10 His vision of nationalism was cultural, not territorially-based and he viewed religion as monotheism, of which Islam was the ultimate expression. Insofar as Colonel Qadhafi has discussed such issues at length since those early days, the best source for them has proved to be the collections of his speeches over the years. These make it clear that the Leader of the Revolution has several ongoing concerns that continue to inform his worldview and that find their ideological antecedents in this conceptual bedrock. A problem here is that his speeches are often internally

contradictory but certain clear themes do, nevertheless, emerge. One of the key elements has been his attitude toward the colonial experience in Libya and elsewhere. He sees this as having been a hegemonic project, which is still active and

responsible for the ills of the developing world today. Thus, in Sebha in 2007, he blamed colonialism for the divisions that exist inside the Muslim world, particularly that between sunnism and shi’ism. The importance of the Fatimids, under whom

Sunni and Shi’a lived in harmony together to Colonel Qadhafi was to be made clear in a subsequent speech. Allied to this is a powerful sense of anti-imperialism, most recently voiced in a meeting of the European Union and the African Union in 2006 where he blamed European powers for the confusions of identity and language that affect Africa.14 Yet, at the same

time, no doubt as a pragmatic reflection of the contemporary Libyan reality, he has claimed that Europe is no longer a colonial power; it is intent, instead, on cooperation with Libya and Africa. A counterweight to Colonel Qadhafi’s anti-imperialism is an abiding belief in the value of national unity around shared cultural paradigms. Originally, of course, this was based on the linguistic principles behind Arab nationalism and was a core component in defining the Libyan revolution as a statement about shared Arab identity, as enunciated in Gamel Abdel Nasser’s Egypt in the 1960s. The failure of the ideal of Arab Unity, interestingly enough, is today attributed to the divisive effects of colonialism and Zionism, thus implicitly identifying the Arab nationalism project as anti-imperialist and progressive.16 Its failure has meant, for the colonel, the betrayal of the Palestinians, although, in the Libyan domestic context, he has often been unsympathetic to

Palestinian needs and concerns. Even though Libya effectively abandoned its pursuit of the Arab unity ideal after 1997, the principle of unity remains. Now it has been turned toward Africa and, although the cultural principles behind Arab unity cannot apply, Colonel Qadhafi has turned back to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism to justify his call for continental integration. According to Qadhafi, it is the shared colonial experience that binds Africans together, an experience that

continues as Europe and America continue to exploit the continent.18 Unity is thus a recognition of the implicit threat to developmental objectives that postcolonial interference represents. No real development can occur in Africa, the Libyan

leader would argue, without the prerequisite of political unity. Even if the Libyan leader does define the ideological agenda behind Libyan foreign policy in terms that relate to anti-imperialism and regional unity, as his comments on Europe

suggest, he is increasingly obliged to recognize practical realities.20 Since the end of the Lockerbie crisis in 1997,21 Libya has been able to rebuild its bridges with the West, destroyed by the Qadhafi regime’s espousal of a radical and  onfrontational agenda in the 1970s, an approach that eventually culminated in American attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986. Libya’s response was not defiant; instead the regime began, opportunistically and pragmatically, to try to rebuild its relations with European states and the United States, a venture that the Lockerbie affair delayed but did not effectively alter. This suggests that, alongside the radical anti-imperialist ideology that Colonel Qadhafi’s Libya has espoused since the beginning of the regime, there is also a profound opportunism and pragmatism that informs the reality of Libya’s foreign policy. Thus, in 1970, Libya had been responsible for ushering in the rise in oil prices that was to

eventually see oil producers wrest control of the oil market from the international oil companies and thus set the stage for the spate of nationalizations of oil properties later on in the decade. Yet the colonel is well aware of the essentially cooperative nature of the relationship between producer and consumer, as he made clear during his visit to Paris in 2007.

Indeed, the juxtaposition of ideology and pragmatic opportunism helps to clarify the sometimes abrupt changes in policy direction that occur. Indeed, the three concepts of ideology, pragmatism, and opportunism are not mutually exclusive but can be mobilized in combination with, and in response to specific problems, as has been made clear by Libya’s varying reactions over time to the United States.23 Thus, when Libya opened its borders in 1997 to the rest of Africa on an ideological impulse, it created a massive migrant problem which, by September 2000, generated extensive anti-migrant violence in Libya’s western coastal cities. Yet, subsequently, it had no problem in collaborating with the European Union, especially with Italy, in preventing migrant flows northwards into Europe.24 It was particularly anxious to collaborate after Italy had been encouraged, by a sudden flux of migrants into Lampedusa in 2004, to persuade the European

Council to remove the arms embargo imposed on Libya years earlier, so that it could reequip its naval and border forces

The ideological dimension of Libyan foreign policy was incorporated into a foreign policy model by Mary-Jane Deeb in her discussion of Libyan policy in North Africa in the 1980s. She describes the Libyan foreign policy system as a pyramid, with the neighboring states of North Africa and the Sahel at the peak, the Arab world dominated by the Mashriq next, followed by the Islamic world overall, then the developing world and, as a substratum at the base, the industrialized countries of both East and West, as they then were. She adds that, the more remote an issue has been from Libya’s core interests —

which are security-led in nature and dominated by North Africa — the more ideologically motivated policy will be. With respect to the role of Libyan pragmatism in foreign policy, she points to Zartman and Kluge’s conclusions given The Arab and African worlds demonstrate another aspect of Libyan policy in action. Both are arenas for ideological experiment, the second being chosen when the first failed to live up to Libya’s expectations. Yet both are also opportunities for alliance-building through aid in order to enhance Libya’s regional standing. This, in turn, demonstrates how opportunist pragmatism supplements ideology in achieving desired policy outcomes. And both demonstrate the inability of Libya’s intensely personalized policy institutions to achieve the real outcomes that the country has sought, as other states exploit

or reject it in terms of their own national interests.

Given the nature of the Libyan revolution as a statement about the country’s place within the Arab world and Colonel Qadhafi’s self-identification as an Arab nationalist and the heir of the Egyptian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, after his death in 1970, the Arab world has always played a central role within Libyan perceptions of its foreign relations. This has led to Libya’s repeated attempts at regional integration, with Egypt and Sudan in 1970, with Tunisia in 1974, and with

Syria in 1980. Nor have such attempts been limited to Middle Eastern States, as the initiative to Tunisia demonstrated; there were also similar attempts with Chad in 1980 and Morocco in 1984.

There is no doubt that the driver for these initiatives was ideological and they were not always met with great success. None of the initiatives materialized as other regional states quickly understood and distrusted their implications and,

in one case at least, the consequent hostility led to war. In July 1977, Egypt and Libya fought a short border war until Algeria stepped in as the guarantor of Libya’s territorial integrity, warning Egypt off from continuing its aggression. In some

cases, the initiatives were heavily tinged with pragmatic considerations, for in North Africa at least — and even in the  ahel — they had more to do with influencing regional politics than with ideological presuppositions, an issue that is discussed below. The upshot of all these initiatives was to profoundly disillusion the Libyan leader and his close advisors about the reliability of fellow Arab governments. Thus, although the ideal of Arab nationalism was preserved as a popular and

populist option, its utility as an instrument of high policy was progressively abandoned over a period of 20 years. Colonel Qadhafi conversely became an ever more explicit critic of the policies of Arab governments, particularly over the issue

of Palestine and the failure of the Arab League and of Arab states to challenge the Israeli state. Ideological prejudices continued to inform this approach, even as ideology was being abandoned in other foreign policy arenas. Thus, in the wake of the 1993 Oslo Accords and the subsequent declaration of the Palestinian National Authority in July 1994 as a protosovereign governing entity, in May 1995 Libya expelled all its 13,000 Palestinian immigrants and refugees along with a major drive to rid the country of unwanted refugees on the grounds that they now had a state to which they could return. The Israeli authorities did not agree and, for almost two years, the refugees existed in miserable conditions on the border with Egypt before they were allowed to return to Libya. By this time, too, Libya was smarting from what it perceived as a betrayal by its Arab brothers in not supporting it against the sanctions imposed by the United Nations in connection with the Lockerbie crisis and, in 1998, it suddenly announced that the ideal of Arab Unity had been replaced in the official iconography by African Unity instead. Since that time, Libya has continued to be part of the Arab League, although

in recent years the Libyan leader has repeatedly threatened to leave the organization and Arab nationalism has played an ever-decreasing role in Libya’s foreign policy imperatives. The Libyan decision to prioritize African unity

instead coincided with a decision by African leaders in September 1997 to ignore the United Nations-imposed embargo on air travel to Libya,a development that signaled the imminent collapse of the whole sanctions regime. It also forced Western states to contemplate other approaches to the Libyan issue, a development that was to culminate in the British approach to Libya to resolve the difficulties over the Lockerbie affair. Yet this reversal to a dominant African dimension to Libya’s foreign policy merely reflected a concern that in the past had played a major role in foreign policy, even if bordinatedto the imperative of Arab unity.

Indeed, this was probably the reason why Africa had been a major concern of the Qadhafi regime very early on, after it came to power in 1969.59 Its interest in part mirrored that of its predecessor, particularly over the Aozou Strip in Northern

Chad, which a Libyan military column briefly penetrated in 1955. But, initially, revolutionary Libya’s interests in Africa were far wider, ranging from a successful campaign to dissuade African states from maintaining relations with Israel to

widespread intervention in African economies and support for radical anti-Western states and national liberation movements, such as the African National Congress.60 It also sought to use its oil wealth to achieve its policy objectives and to extend its influence, particularly in West Africa.

In the end, of course, Libyan policy in Africa became rather messily unstuck and its early successes were reversed. Although by 1973, 20 African states had severed relations with Israel, a decade later diplomatic relations were being steadily restored. Libyan largesse and commercial interest had also been revealed to often have negative connotations for domestic stability and a range of specific interventions had either failed previously.

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