The Cuban Revolution

                                    Background

Cuba was a Spanish Colony One of the wealthiest in Latin America Economy based on Sugar exports to US and Europe Spanish controlled the nation politically, economically and

Socially Large underclass of Blacks (descendants of Slaves) and poor mestizos

Spanish-American War

US occupies Cuba 1899-1902 US helped to write new Cuban Constitution modeled on US version

Platt Amendment was added—Gave US the right to intervene in Cuban Affairs, also Guantanamo Bay became US Naval base

Post War

US sent troops several times from 1902-1953 Huge US investment in Sugar ($200 Million by 1913 1/5th of all US investment in Latin America at the time

Attempted Revolution of 1933

200,000 sugar workers led an uprising in 1933 In the chaos, a group of military leaders took control

Led by Fulgencio Batista He continued to rule behind the scenes in Cuba until 1952

Batista

Took over in a coup in 1952 pro-US Anti labor Cuban Elites liked Batista Most Cubans did not Was a dictator

Maintained social system, economic dependence on Sugar, strong ties to US This was the time that Havana was the “hot” spot for US tourists—night clubs, gambling

The Cuban Revolution The Revolution itself

It began with the assault on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, and ended on January 1, 1959, when Batista was driven from the country and the cities Santa Clara and Santiago de Cuba were seized by rebels,

led by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro's surrogates Raul Castro and Huber Matos, respectively.

Fidel Castro

He led the revolution and shortly after was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Cuba. Castro became First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba in 1965, and led the transformation of Cuba into a one-party socialist republic. Castro became popular for his anti-US policies because Cubans saw US as imperialistic.

Long Term Causes #1: Sugar

The Cuban economy was based primarily on Sugar—not diversified Economy rose and fell on Sugar Most of the Sugar plantations were in the hands of Foreign (US mostly) investors or wealthy upper class Cubans Seasonal unemployment high Created structural inequalities in the Cuban population Markets tied to the US

Long Term Causes #2:

Anti-US resentment Since the Spanish-American War and Cuban Independence, a great deal of resentment towards US

control/effect on Cuban economy and politics

Long Term Causes #3:

Political Instability

From Independence on Cuba had no real stable political experience Some attempts at reform from time to time, but not much accomplished

Power in the hands of the elites US essentially ran Cuba 3 different times from 1900s-1930s Large economic gap between rich and poor Rich elites were white, small % of the pop. Rest of nation was mestizos, Afro-Cuban Land in the hands of elites or foreign interests Workers did try to unionize, but not particularly successful

Long Term Causes #4:

Social / Economic Inequities

Short Term Causes #1:

Batista’s Regime 1952-1959  Did not bring about reforms Repression At first the U.S. supported the Batista regime, but as conditions worsened in Cuba, US pulled support Even middle class went against Batista

Short Term Cause #2: Rise of Castro

Attack on Mocada army barracks 1953 failure Castro arrested, but freed later  gives the revolutionaries some hope and momentum Creation of 26th of July Movement Defeats of Batista’s forces Appeal, both in Cuba and US, of Castro’s movement  brought more support

The Cuban Revolution

Aims and Achievements – Implementing the revolution - Historians do not agree as to whether Castro was communist from the beginning or not But beginning in 1959 Castro began to move Cuba towards a more

socialist/communist state He had several goals:

Economic Goals:

Nationalization Nationalized US companies: Oil refineries, telephone, private companies By October of 1959 all US owned businesses were nationalized US under Eisenhower begins economic embargo as a retaliation John F Kennedy later cuts diplomatic ties with Cuba Economic Aims: Industrial Production -- At first Castro attempted to increase Cuba’s industrial production -- Failed because of mismanagement, corruption Economic Aims Sugar Production.

 In 1970 Castro called for Cuba to produce 10 Million tons of Sugar Mobilized resources across the nation Fell short--8.5 million tons produced--biggest sugar production ever in Cuba Took resources away from other sectors of the economy Pushed Cuba to have to embrace USSR in order to survive Economic Aim Soviet-style economic management After Sugar failure, Castro turned to USSR, USSR agreed to help but wanted greater control in return Soviet-style economic management    with Soviet advisors making decisions, State made policies and decisions, Allowed some small private enterprises, State run business could pay bonuses and fire employees Until about 1976 when the economy grew, but price of sugar fell to 8¢ pound in ‘77 and economy dropped.                   

Social Aims

Free universal education, Universal Health care, Child care, Government subsidized housing, Social security programs

Cuba had the most equal distribution of wealth in the Americas

Borrowed heavily from Canada, Europe Japan--unable to pay back in the 1980s

Political Aims

Cuba as leader of revolutionary movements around the world, Castro wanted to export the revolution around the globe

Help other revolutions against imperialist/colonial powers, Central America, Africa, Vietnam. Cuba sent troops and support

Helped to bring about a Marxist government in Angola in the 1980s, also helped to bring a Socialist government to Nicaragua in 1979.

Effects of these attempts?

Successful in bringing about revolutions in a few places, failed in others (Bolivia for example). Castro support for Marxist rebel group, MPLA in Angola hurt chances for an improvement in US-Cuban relations when the US was ready.

Support of USSR in their war in Afghanistan damaged Cuba’s position as the leader of the Non-Aligned Nations (Countries not tied to US or USSR during the Cold War). Created a large group of Cubans serving as aid workers and doctors around the world (by 1979 14,000 Cubans were working overseas).

Political Aims - Control Dissent within Cuba, Thousands of Cubans were arrested and detained for speaking out against the Revolution or government policies Created anger and resentment among many Cubans and human rights groups • In Cuba, social and economic trends led to a revolution. There, social inequality and heavy U.S. influence led to a revolt that brought communism to this large Caribbean island. • Cuba very dependent on U.S. • 1950s, hotels, casinos owned by wealthy Americans, Cuba’s elite • U.S. owned sugar, tobacco plantations.            

Reasons for Revolt

• Valuable exports from plantations • Little land for peasants to farm • Cuba one of richest Latin American countries

• Most Cubans could not earn living

Rich and Poor

• Business interests encouraged U.S. government support of corrupt dictators

• Anticommunist Fulgencio Batista took power in 1952 military coup with U.S. Support.

The Cuban Revolution

• The coming of Castro  - • Batista’s Cuba

• “A rich country with too many poor people”. • Batista’s coup stirred discontent nationalist among poor

 Revolutionaries under Castro  Led unsuccessful attack in 1953; guerrilla war became fullscale revolution in 1955

• Batista fled in 1959; Castro took control • Castro focused on ending U.S. dominance, redistributing wealth, reforming society • Energies went to restructuring economy, society, government, foreign policy • 1961, program virtually eliminated illiteracy in one year • Created medical care system, raised life expectancy

Castro’s Programs

• Broad support for revolution to remove Batista

• Most did not know what kind of revolution Castro would lead

• Middle-class Cubans supported moderate democratic reforms

• Many Castro revolutionaries, including Che Guevara, wanted Marxist regime

Goals of the Revolution

• Changes under Castro

• Limited size of landholdings

• Nationalized private property, businesses

• To ensure he had power to make changes

• Took full control of government

• Took away freedom of press

• Result of radical actions

• Led Cuba more toward communism

• Led Cuba toward confrontation with U.S.

•U.S. Involvement

• Cuba’s move toward communism troubled U.S. leaders

• Viewed Latin America as part of U.S. sphere of influence

• Wanted to keep communism out of region

•Cuban Missile Crisis

• 1962, CIA learned Soviet Union building nuclear missile site in Cuba

• President John Kennedy ordered naval blockage to keep Soviet ships out

• World came close to nuclear war before compromise, missiles removed

•Organization of American States

• Set up shortly after World War II to promote economic, military cooperation

• 1961, U.S.-trained invasion force of Cuban exiles landed at Bay of Pigs

• Mission to spark nationwide uprising against Castro; mission failed

The Cuban Revolution

• Mixed results as well; economy suffered from U.S. embargo

• Castro’s policies led many Cubans to leave country, many for U.S.; caused economy to

struggle

• Castro relied on Soviet Union for economic support; Soviet collapse in 1991 hurt economy

Economic Effects of Revolution

• Mixed results since Cold War; good access to health care, education

• People’s civil liberties restricted under one-party system

• Government jails opponents, spies on citizens

Results of the Revolution

Mixed results as well; economy suffered from U.S. embargo

• Castro’s policies led many Cubans to leave country, many for U.S.; caused economy to struggle

• Castro relied on Soviet Union for economic support; Soviet collapse in 1991 hurt economy

Economic Effects of Revolution

• Mixed results since Cold War; good access to health care, education

• People’s civil liberties restricted under one-party system

• Government jails opponents, spies on citizens

UN Mission in Liberia

Background. In June 2003, only three months before the deployment of the first UN

peacekeeping mission in Liberia, the Secretary General – in his assessment report to the

Security Council – made the following insightful observation:

“Liberia remains the epicenter of the continuing endemic instability, which is gravely

affecting the political, humanitarian and security landscape not only in the Mano River

Union subregion but also throughout much of West Africa.”119

His comments, coming at a time when the country was seemingly plunging once again into

civil war, help draw the political map of a conflict which ravaged the Mano River countries120

– Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea – for more than a decade, starting with the early 1990s. In

a region characterized by potentially explosive ethnic conflicts and shady political

maneuvering, the complicated allegiances between politicians, rebel groups, military, and

unofficial militias actively contributed to the creation of a pervasive culture of impunity and

massive human rights violations. Unofficial ties between presidential hopefuls, such as

General Gueï of Côte d’Ivoire – the mastermind of the 1999 Ivorian coup d’état – and the

Liberian Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel group, reveal the workings of regional networks of power which helped maintain a climate of

political instability121. In this context, as the Secretary General pointed out in March 2005,

“durable peace” within the region – Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone — could only be

achieved if “a number of key issues [are] addressed at both the national and the subregional

level” 122. These key issues referred to the tackling of what the Secretary General identified as

the “the root causes” of instability: the active recruitment of ex-combatants, the lack of

coordination in disarmament and demobilization programs, failure to prevent human rights

violations, non-compliance with the ceasefire agreement etc. By emphasizing the need for a

new, integrated type of approach in dealing with local warfare, the Secretary General also

signalled that the international community was finally talking a proactive stance in Liberia,

whose civilian population had experienced two civil wars, massive displacement, and human

rights abuses123.

The roots of the Liberian crisis can be traced as far back as 1980, when Master Sergeant

Samuel Doe’s military coup brutally ousted from power President William Tolbert Jr. and laid

the seeds for the country’s first civil war (1989 - 1997). The subsequent period of violent

clashes between insurgents – among which a prominent faction was Charles Taylor’s National

Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – and governmental forces officially ended with the signing

of the Abuja Agreement on August 19, 1995, brokered by ECOWAS. Despite several

ceasefire violations and armed attacks, the July 1997 presidential elections – declared free and

fair by international observers – legitimized the de facto leadership of Charles Taylor and

succeeded in re-stabilizing the country. Peace was however short-lived, and by April 1999

hostilities were re-opened with a new, reconfigured set of political actors: LURD, (Liberians

United for Reconciliation and Democracy) representing the largest anti-Taylor rebel faction

and having Guinea as a likely sponsor124, the so-called MODEL or the Movement for

Democracy in Liberia, potentially backed by Côte d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo125, and the

president’s security forces, split between various independent and competing units126. By May

2003 however, when it had become clear that the NPFL was losing the war, international

mediation succeeded in bringing the parties back to the negotiation table. The result was the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by all major stakeholders in Accra, Ghana on August 18. President Taylor handed over power to Vice-President Moses Blah and left

Liberia for a comfortable exile in Nigeria. A National Transitional Government was agreed

upon, and provisions were made for the organization of presidential elections in October

2005, which took place according to the initial schedule and resulted in the election of

Liberia’s first woman President: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

Despite maintaining a rather low profile in the Liberian crisis – mostly handled internationally

by ECOWAS, which had established an observer mission in Monrovia, ECOMOG (The

Military Observer Group), as early as 1990 – the UN involvement in the country’s civil wars

had been quite constant, although not necessarily effective in terms of civilian protection.

The two consecutive UN missions – UNOMIL (the United Nations Observer Mission in

Liberia) authorized by Security Council Resolution 866 of September 22, 1993 and UNOL

(The United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia) established by the Secretary

General on November 1, 1997 – had largely played an advisory role, helping either the

ECOWAS mission, or the Liberian Government in implementing peace agreements and

providing logistic support for the 1997 election (UNOMIL) and for the further consolidation

of the peace process (UNOL). Although the Security Council had been aware of massive

human rights abuses prior to and after the election of Charles Taylor, it decided – at least until

the 1999 outbreak of violence – not to upgrade its missions to the level of peacekeeping

operations. However, the UN position changed considerably after the signing of the Accra

Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The parties invited the Council to deploy a peacekeeping

force in Liberia “to support the National Transitional Government and assist in the

implementation of the Peace Agreement”127 and to ensure, in general, the stability of the

country’s democratically elected regime.

UNMIL (2003 – 2005). Answering these international requests for a stronger UN presence in

Liberia, the Security Council issued Resolution 1497 of August 1, 2003, authorizing the

deployment of an ECOWAS mission – ECOMIL – as the first step in a peacekeeping

operation which would ultimately establish a longer-term UN stabilization force. The

ECOMIL multinational unit – the result of an extraordinary ECOWAS summit at Accra on

July 31, 2003 – was mandated among others to support the implementation of the ceasefire

agreement and to ensure a level of security that would enable the delivery of humanitarian

assistance. The issues of civilian protection and human rights violations figured high on the Security Council’s agenda, an outcome perhaps of UN’s previous failure to effectively

address these problems during Liberia’s two decades of political instability.

In his preliminary September 2003 report, while presenting his recommendations regarding

the size, structure, and mandate of a follow-up UN mission, the Secretary General estimated

that as a consequence of ongoing fighting and regime brutality nearly 1,000,000 people –

from a population of approximately 2,5 million – had been displaced, either internally or as

refugees in neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, the

report mentioned that since 1989 from an estimated number of 250,000 war victims

approximately half of them had been non-combatants128. According to the Secretary General,

eyewitness accounts as well as reports of mass graves – some of them dating back to 1990 –

were just as many proofs testifying about the level of violence which the country had

experienced, with all factions equally accused of having reverted to torture, mutilations,

sexual violence, killings, and the use of child soldiers. The militarization of Liberian society

and the proliferation of militia groups lacking any “statutory command and control

structure”129 had triggered, argued the Secretary General, the creation of “culture of

violence”130 which could only be eliminated by concerted UN actions131.

In the light of these recommendations and based on the findings of the UN multidisciplinary

assessment mission led by the Secretary General’s Special Representative Jacques Paul Klein,

the Security Council passed resolution 1509 of September 19, 2003 authorizing the

deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Its mandate focused on five

important tasks: (1) the implementation of the ceasefire; (2) the protection of United Nations

staff, facilities, and civilians; (3) support for humanitarian and human rights assistance; (4)

support for security reform; and (5) support for the implementation of the peace process.

Overall, UNMIL was assigned to start the much needed DDRR program (disarmament,

demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration), to ensure the security of both locals and

humanitarian workers, and – on a more general level – to help pacifying the country ahead of

the scheduled October 2005 elections. The mission – which was to be deployed throughout

Liberia in four major sectors with the headquarters in Monrovia132 – consisted of up to 15,000

authorized military personnel, including approximately 250 military observers and 160 staff

officers as well as a maximum of 1,115 civilian police officers. On October 1, 2003 the

ECOMIL forces underwent a “re-hatting” procedure as UN personnel, thus signaling the complete takeover of its peacekeeping functions by the newly established UNMIL, under the

command of Special Representative Klein. The deployment of troops occurred in several

stages, with soldiers being gradually relocated from Monrovia to all the above-mentioned

sectors. Despite continuing violent clashes between rebels, peacekeepers, and governmental

forces, the Secretary General’s first progress report emphasized the “considerable progress

achieved in consolidating stability in Monrovia and its surroundings”133. By March 2004,

after the deployment of additional troops, the Secretary General maintained that although

human rights violations were still reported throughout Liberia “most of the abuses and

violations had taken place in isolated areas where peacekeepers ha[d] not been deployed”134.

The positive trend in reducing criminality and countering violent looting perpetrated by

former combatants is obvious in his subsequent reports to the Security Council. Moreover, the

changing nature of these attacks – usually conducted by disaffected former combatants or

LURD splinter factions – suggested that the conflict’s scale was reduce from formerly wellorganized

and destabilizing forms of protest to “minor crimes” and “civil unrest”135. As an

example of the mission’s strength, both in terms of its military and civilian components, in his

December 2004 report the Secretary General praised the swift UNMIL reaction to a series of

incidents which had occurred between 28 and 31 October, when an initial land dispute had

quickly escalated into severe rioting and burning of private property. Although initially

deploying only its civilian police, in the face of mounting street pressure UNMIL “undertook

robust action to bring the situation under control and forestall further acts of violence in the

affected areas”136.“Robust action” meant fast redeployment of one infantry and two additional

police units to Monrovia, patrols in the dangerous sections of the city conducted by the

UNMIL Quick Reaction Force, aerial reconnaissance and show-of-force patrols over the city,

the sealing of Monrovia’s main entry points (or roads), and cordon-and-search operations.

Military actions were enforced by radio appeals to calm coming from Special representative

Jacques Paul Klein, officials of the National Transitional Government, and members of the

Inter-Religious Council of Liberia. A light curfew was also imposed by the Chairman of the

National Transition Government, Gyude Bryant. The result was the quick restoration of order

with minimum casualties137. The successful coordination of actions between various UNMIL

units and Liberian officials proved that provocative attacks by ex-combatants and active rebel

factions could be effectively controlled. In terms of civilian protection achievements, the improved security conditions ensured that the UNMIL human rights unit could focus on

monitoring and registering abuses as well as in actively advising the government on the

implementation of adequate legislation138. In February 2006, the independent expert on the

situation of human rights in Liberia, Charlotte Abaka, submitted a comprehensive report on

the issue and mentioned that “improvements in the security situation have enhanced freedom

of movement and facilitated the conduct of national elections”139. Although, as the Secretary

General pointed out in his last report on Liberia, in December 2005, the situation was “calm,

but fragile”140, substantial progress had been made in re-establishing the rule of law. Recently,

the Security Council – indirectly acknowledging these positive developments – has decided to

redeploy UNMIL personnel for the protection of the Special Court for Sierra Leone141 and a

maximum of one infantry company for UNOCI142, the United Nations’ Operation in Côte

d’Ivoire.

In summary. Overall, taking into consideration the two indicators of effectiveness we have so

far analyzed, it has become clear from the analytical reading of the case study that UNMIL

has fulfilled its mandated task. Given the efficiency of its measures for the restoration of order

(indicator 2) and the protection of civilians within its areas of deployment as well as the

control (indicator 1) exercised by UN troops over Liberia’s territory, our assessment of the

case is positive: UNMIL has been effective in protecting civilians. After applying the analytic framework to our analysis of Liberia’s UN intervention a couple

of interesting results have emerged. First, the Liberian case can be considered a success story,

also in view of the country’s October 2005 elections when, after what international observers

had declared a free and fair process - a woman, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, was elected head of

state. The improving security situation in Liberia and the ever growing participation of its

civil society in ongoing deliberations about the country’s reconstruction process is a telling

proof that UNMIL has been effective in protecting civilians. Second, almost all the factors

under analysis have been assigned positive values. The UN mission is thus characterized by

an adequate size, sufficient equipment, high commitment, and credibility. Its human rights

component (“Expert Knowledge”) is actively engaged in promoting human rights culture and

legislation. The UN troops are homogeneous – as defined in Section 5.1. – and the salience of

the “protection of civilians” task within the mission’s mandate is high. Moreover, with respect

to potential conflicts, the situation is stable, although as yet fragile. The DDR program has

successfully demobilized ex-combatants and large quantities of weapons have been

confiscated. Despite ongoing looting, especially in more remote areas of the country, and

persistent, though small scale street clashes, the intensity of the conflict is low. The UN is

perceived as the legitimate actor in the implementation of the peace process (high

“Legitimacy”) and the reconstruction of Liberia’s democratic institutions. Cooperation from

major political figures, though tentative at first, has positively evolved over the last year. In

conclusion, we can safely say that UNMIL is actively fulfilling its peacekeeping mandate (not

“enforcement mandate” though) and that the protection of civilians has figured high on the

agenda from the first moment of the mission’s deployment. The protection of civilians, if necessary with the help of military force, is a

relatively new task in the ever-increasing repertoire of functions which UN peacekeeping

missions have come to assume, especially since the end of the Cold War. At the same time,

for civilians caught in the devastating dynamics of the “new wars”, physical protection is

doubtlessly the most important and immediate concern. The novelty and salience of the

protection of civilians by international forces justify the highest level of academic attention.

Bibliography

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